TIME WARNER INC.

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The following is a transcript of a live interview with AT&T CEO Randall Stephenson and Time Warner Inc. CEO Jeff Bewkes posted on the website of the Wall Street Journal on October 25, 2016:

- 1 PROCEEDINGS
- 2 INTRODUCTORY SPEAKER: All
- 3 right, what would you buy if I
- 4 gave you 85 billion dollars? AT&T
- 5 just bought Bugs Bunny, Batman,
- 6 and the Baratheon family, it's the
- deal of the fall, and I'm sure
- 8 you've got a lot of questions, and
- 9 we've built in some time for that
- 10 today.
- To get things started let's
- bring out the deputy editor in
- chief, Rebecca Blumenstein, also
- the CEO of AT&T, Randall
- 15 Stephenson, and the chairman and
- 16 CEO of Time Warner, Jeff Bewkes.
- 17 MS. BLUMENSTEIN: Well,
- thanks so much to you both for

- coming all the way, after
- announcing the biggest media deal
- 21 in years.
- I -- I want to cut to the

Page 1

| 1 | chase: Time Warner was bought |
|--------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | once before, tell me why it's |
| 3 | going to turn out better this |
| 4 | time. |
| 5 | MR. STEPHENSON: Well, we |
| 6 | didn't try before, all right? |
| 7 | I'll start there. |
| 8 | But this this deal was |
| 9 | about one thing, and that was, how |
| 10 | could we change the game in this |
| 11 | ecosystem, because if there was |
| 12 | ever an environment that was |
| 13 | begging for innovation it is this |
| 14 | environment. |
| 15 | And if you think about |
| 16 | what's happened in this system |
| 17 | literally you have 20 million |
| 18 | households now who have left the |
| 19 | premium content system. They're |
| 20 | not buying a bundle of premium |
| 21 | content, they're gone, they're not |
| Page 2 | around, and this is one of the |

| 1 | things we're trying to do, how do |
|--------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | you begin to do something to |
| 3 | access that that segment of the |
| 4 | market. |
| 5 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: So they've |
| 6 | kind of cut the cord? |
| 7 | MR. STEPHENSON: Yeah, |
| 8 | they've cut the cord. They're not |
| 9 | even engaged in the premium |
| 10 | ecosystem anymore. |
| 11 | And then so we're going to |
| 12 | launch, at the end of next month, |
| 13 | November, a product that we think |
| 14 | does this, and that's what this |
| 15 | deal is about, and I think it's |
| 16 | important to understand it, it's |
| 17 | Direct TV Now is what we're |
| 18 | calling it, but this is, for the |
| 19 | first time, a hundred plus premium |
| 20 | channels, all right? This isn't |
| 21 | the junk nobody wants. This is a |
| 22 Page 3 | hundred plus premium channels, |

| 1 | purely over the top, a mobile |
|--------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | centric platform for \$35 a month, |
| 3 | all right? It has all of Jeff's |
| 4 | content, it has all the premium |
| 5 | content that you know and love, |
| 6 | you like to watch, \$35 a month, |
| 7 | and that includes your mobile |
| 8 | streaming costs, all right? |
| 9 | Streaming it over the mobile |
| 10 | internet. So 35 bucks pretty much |
| 11 | all in, we think this is big. We |
| 12 | think it's a game changer. |
| 13 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: So you're |
| 14 | making more news now by announcing |
| 15 | the price point. |
| 16 | MR. STEPHENSON: We haven't |
| 17 | announced the price point before |
| 18 | but we're announcing it right now. |
| 19 | And as you think about people |
| 20 | saying this is nothing but a way |
| 21 | to increase prices, no, this is a |
| 22 Page 4 | way to drive pricing down in the |

| 1 | marketplace. We think this is |
|--------------|-----------------------------------|
| 2 | really important. |
| 3 | And I think there's |
| 4 | something else that's important, |
| 5 | and it's instructive to how you |
| 6 | consider this deal, and that is: |
| 7 | That would not be possible, we |
| 8 | started trying to develop this |
| 9 | product over a year ago, it would |
| 10 | not be possible had we not done |
| 11 | the Direct TV deal, it would be |
| 12 | impossible, because we had been |
| 13 | trying to do this for the last |
| 14 | three years. |
| 15 | We cannot get the media |
| 16 | companies to participate in this |
| 17 | until we have scale, in fact, |
| 18 | interestingly enough, one of the |
| 19 | last companies to finally come in |
| 20 | to this hundred channel package |
| 21 | was Fox. They were the last ones |
| 22 Page 5 | to come in. |

| 1 | And I think what's equally |
|--------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | instructive is one of the first |
| 3 | ones in was NBC Universal, which I |
| 4 | think is ironic, when you think |
| 5 | that the one company that is |
| 6 | vertically integrated, like we're |
| 7 | talking about doing, is one of the |
| 8 | first ones in doing the innovation |
| 9 | in the marketplace. |
| 10 | And I would tell you one of |
| 11 | the other first ones in was this |
| 12 | guy, we got TBS, TNT, all of those |
| 13 | channels we got in early in the |
| 14 | game. And and I think that's a |
| 15 | really important observation, that |
| 16 | if you want to innovate you're |
| 17 | going to have to have scale, |
| 18 | you're going to have to have |
| 19 | content that will allow you to |
| 20 | innovate. |
| 21 | And so to that end, just |
| 22 Page 6 | considering that, there was a lot |

| 1 | of noise yesterday around what |
|--------|-----------------------------------|
| 2 | this new company looks like, and |
| 3 | and what people should be |
| 4 | concerned with. |
| 5 | And we have, internally, at |
| 6 | AT&T, that Jeff's team will be |
| 7 | introduced to, we call it our |
| 8 | Magna Carta: What are the guiding |
| 9 | principles as you put these two |
| 10 | companies together. And it starts |
| 11 | with, "Dear AT&T executives, with |
| 12 | distribution assets, Direct TV, |
| 13 | our mobility company, number one |
| 14 | principle of the Magna Carta is: |
| 15 | Recognize, Time Warner will |
| 16 | continue to distribute their |
| 17 | content widely and broadly. |
| 18 | You're now going to get exclusive |
| 19 | access to Time Warner content. |
| 20 | They've built a franchise on wide |
| 21 | and broad distribution that's |
| Page 7 | going to continue. |

| 1 | Time Warner, when you come |
|--------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | in, point number two, our |
| 3 | distribution businesses are going |
| 4 | to continue to distribute a wide |
| 5 | variety of content. That's what |
| 6 | the customers expect and want, a |
| 7 | hundred channels of premium |
| 8 | content, that will not change. |
| 9 | Time Warner don't expect that to |
| 10 | be premium. |
| 11 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: So you're |
| 12 | vowing you're not going to take |
| 13 | any price advantage? |
| 14 | MR. STEPHENSON: We're |
| 15 | actually trying to bring prices |
| 16 | down, \$35, you know, find that in |
| 17 | the marketplace with wireless |
| 18 | streaming, right? |
| 19 | Principle number three, and |
| 20 | this is to the AT&T board, when |
| 21 | you own a news company |
| 22 Page 8 | independence is sacrosanct. You |

| 1 | must protect the independent |
|--------|-----------------------------------|
| 2 | editorial privileges of that news |
| 3 | organization. And to the extent |
| 4 | your customers deem otherwise you |
| 5 | damage the brand of a CNN, |
| 6 | specifically. |
| 7 | Fourth is, Time Warner is |
| 8 | going to become the launching pad |
| 9 | for innovation. Time Warner is |
| 10 | what we're going to try to touch |
| 11 | these third rails that the |
| 12 | industry will not and has not |
| 13 | touched. It's where we're going |
| 14 | to begin to experiment and test, |
| 15 | how can you bring a la carte |
| 16 | pricing into the ecosystem? How |
| 17 | can you do that? |
| 18 | I think this is going to be |
| 19 | a really important innovation. |
| 20 | It's also the place where we'll |
| 21 | begin to develop new ad support |
| Page 9 | models, where you can net \$35 |

| 1 | price point, these content costs |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | are not going to be flat. So how |
| 3 | can we develop new ad models that |
| 4 | will allow us to keep the price |
| 5 | point in check offsetting the |
| 6 | price increases on content? |
| 7 | I think that's really, |
| 8 | really important. And then last |
| 9 | element of our Magna Carta is: We |
| 10 | are going to be a head-to-head |
| 11 | nationwide competitor with the |
| 12 | cable ecosystem. |
| 13 | And 5G deployment is a game |
| 14 | changer. We will be a new |
| 15 | competitor nationwide with 5G. |
| 16 | And so the intent is to bring Time |
| 17 | Warner and AT&T together and |
| 18 | create a very new and a very |
| 19 | different kind of competitor, |
| 20 | nationwide, in the cable |
| 21 | ecosystem. |
| 22 Page 10 | So that's how we're framing |

| 1 | this, this is what we're trying to |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | become as a company. |
| 3 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: So Jeff, |
| 4 | are you trying to right the |
| 5 | historical wrong of AOL, in part, |
| 6 | here? You have come out |
| 7 | previously against the |
| 8 | distribution coming together. |
| 9 | MR. BEWKES: No, no, no, |
| 10 | we're way past that. I've got to |
| 11 | add an example, if I could, and I |
| 12 | think it will resonate with |
| 13 | everybody here: It was about |
| 14 | seven years ago that we at Time |
| 15 | Warner we saw that the world |
| 16 | wanted to go to VOD. We already |
| 17 | had it at HBO. Richard's here, he |
| 18 | talked this morning, we had done |
| 19 | at VOD at HBO 15 or 20 years ago, |
| 20 | but we knew people wanted it on |
| 21 | every channel. |
| 22 Page 11 | So we want and literally |

| 1 | unilaterally at Time Warner we put |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | all our channels out on VOD. We |
| 3 | gave a contract with no |
| 4 | negotiation, no change, any |
| 5 | distributor, large or small, could |
| 6 | take it, and what did it say? It |
| 7 | said: "You can have the right, |
| 8 | cable, telco, satellite, anybody, |
| 9 | you can have the right to have all |
| 10 | our channels on VOD, if you didn't |
| 11 | have it before, you don't pay us |
| 12 | for this, provided, really, one |
| 13 | thing, you don't charge consumers |
| 14 | for it, you don't create a package |
| 15 | where if you pay extra you get it, |
| 16 | another guy doesn't pay he doesn't |
| 17 | get it, it's got to be go got |
| 18 | to go to everybody." |
| 19 | And we also said: "You |
| 20 | can't tie your broadband service |
| 21 | to your video service, because |
| 22 Page 12 | anybody that's got a video |

| 1 | service, anybody who's paid for" |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | which we all know 80 percent, |
| 3 | 90 percent of the people have paid |
| 4 | for CNN, Fox News, et cetera, you |
| 5 | get it, what happened? Seven |
| 6 | years ago. |
| 7 | So we waited, year after |
| 8 | year we've talked about this, the |
| 9 | old media business, the other |
| 10 | media companies, the distributors, |
| 11 | they didn't offer this to |
| 12 | consumers, even though it was |
| 13 | sitting there for no charge. Why |
| 14 | not? Because the old distribution |
| 15 | company they some of them did, |
| 16 | we can go through who did it |
| 17 | better than others, but basically |
| 18 | they didn't want to make the plan |
| 19 | investments in what you have to do |
| 20 | to provide that, they didn't have |
| 21 | either the skill or the scale to |
| 22 Page 13 | do the interfaces, which everybody |

| 1 | out here knows so well is |
|---------------|--|
| 2 | important when you have more and |
| 3 | more volume of programming you |
| 4 | need a better interface to find it |
| 5 | and recommend it and share it, et |
| 6 | cetera. |
| 7 | So that was on the |
| 8 | distributor side. But then you look |
| 9 | at the other network companies, they |
| 10 | didn't offer it, either. Why not? |
| 11 | They were waiting for years for this |
| 12 | renewal negotiation or that renewal |
| 13 | negotiation. That's not how you |
| 14 | change consumer behavior. |
| 15 | What you want, and we wanted |
| 16 | this seven years ago, we want you to |
| 17 | go to your TV dial or your tablet or |
| 18 | your mobile device and you should be |
| 19 | able to get any network on that, on |
| 20 | demand, because the originators of the |
| 21 | program, whether it's NBC or TNT, or |
| 22 Page 14 | HBO, we paid for the program. You |
| | |

1 paid for it, you ought to have it, 2 there's no cost to doing it on DOD. 3 So now we come to this 4 stitch, we've made some progress, 5 there, but you all know what did it force consumers to do in this interim 6 7 period? They all had to go out and 8 pay extra money to get library SVOD 9 services, for the very same 10 programming that should have been 11 available on VOD all along. 12 So we would say, and we've 13 been saying this since 1995, every 14 channel in the country, every network 15 should look like HBO or Netflix. 16 There's no reason it can't. 17 And now we have a 18 distribution platform where we can, 19 together, put out a launching pad of 20 services. And do we want it to be 21 just our channels? No. We want it to 22 be all the most important channels, Page 15

| 1 | just this way I've described just now. |
|---------------|--|
| 2 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: A question |
| 3 | for both of you: How much of this |
| 4 | is offense and how much is |
| 5 | defense? I mean, Randall, your |
| 6 | core business wireless subscribers |
| 7 | are down, ATT subscribers are |
| 8 | down, I mean, is this, in a sense, |
| 9 | almost to vet the company deal? |
| 10 | MR. STEPHENSON: I don't |
| 11 | know how you characterize it, vet |
| 12 | the company deal, when you buy an |
| 13 | asset like this that is EPS |
| 14 | accretive, cash flow accretive, |
| 15 | enhances dividend coverages, keep |
| 16 | credit metrics that are credit |
| 17 | quality, talk great credit |
| 18 | quality. |
| 19 | So I don't see how you can |
| 20 | characterize that as defensive. |
| 21 | It's just something where you have |
| 22 Page 16 | customers, you have a known demand |

| 1 | that customers have, this isn't |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | one of those that you have to do a |
| 3 | lot of guessing and swing for the |
| 4 | fences and hope for the best. |
| 5 | We know what the customers |
| 6 | want. It's really, really |
| 7 | obvious. They want premium |
| 8 | content in a mobile environment. |
| 9 | We have had a really difficult |
| 10 | time getting that put together. |
| 11 | It's been really hard. |
| 12 | This is a way where we can |
| 13 | actually begin to move much, much |
| 14 | faster at bringing bundled premium |
| 15 | content over a mobile environment |
| 16 | to our customer. It's no more |
| 17 | complicated than that. |
| 18 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: Regulators |
| 19 | and politicians have come up to me |
| 20 | against the deal. Donald Trump |
| 21 | has said he would nix it, and |
| 22 Page 17 | actually went further and said |

| 2 Comeast NBC Universal. Tim Kaine 3 has said he has concerns that it 4 would raise consumer prices. 5 And there seems to be a 6 growing sense at the Department of 7 Justice and the FCC about this 8 state of mega deals and true 9 antitrust concerns. 10 What is what is your 11 response, are you surprised by 12 this? 13 MR. STEPHENSON: Not 14 surprised. They're uninformed 15 comments. 16(APPLAUSE) 17 MR. STEPHENSON: Anybody 18 anybody who characterizes this as 19 a means to raise prices is 20 ignoring the basic premise of what 21 we're trying do here. 22 Again, a \$35 product we | 1 | that he would try to do undo |
|---|----|------------------------------------|
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| | 21 | we're trying do here. |
| | | Again, a \$35 product we |

| 1 | bring into the market to innovate |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | on and find new ways of bringing |
| 3 | content to customers, that's not a |
| 4 | medium for raising prices. |
| 5 | Also, vertical integrations |
| 6 | are rarely a means for raising |
| 7 | prices. You're not changing the |
| 8 | market structure in any way, |
| 9 | shape, or form. You're not |
| 10 | changing the broadband market, |
| 11 | you're not changing the wireless |
| 12 | market. |
| 13 | When we wake up, after this |
| 14 | deal is approved, the wireless |
| 15 | market will look exactly the same |
| 16 | as it does today and the media |
| 17 | market will look the same as it |
| 18 | does today. |
| 19 | So this is not this is |
| 20 | not a combination that typically, |
| 21 | you know, gains that kind of |
| 22 Page 19 | horizontal type merger scrutiny, |

1

in fact, it's really important to

| 2 | know it is a, by every technical |
|---------------|--|
| 3 | definition, a vertical merger |
| 4 | integration. And vertical merger |
| 5 | integrations are historically |
| 6 | approved. |
| 7 | Now, it doesn't mean they're |
| 8 | approved carte blanche. Regulators |
| 9 | will have some concerns with this, I'm |
| 10 | quite confident they will. Those |
| 11 | concerns are invariably remedied with |
| 12 | conditions. |
| 13 | So we anticipate there will |
| 14 | be a good, fulsome review and |
| 15 | discussion about this. |
| 16 | MR. BEWKES: You know, we |
| 17 | ought to talk about advertising, |
| 18 | because if you're looking into |
| 19 | competition this is going to be |
| 20 | extremely helpful to increase |
| 21 | competition in advertising. And I |
| 22 Page 20 | think, since we are west of the |

| 1 | mountains, at least where I live, |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | we all need more competition in |
| 3 | advertising because what we've |
| 4 | been seeing is growing |
| 5 | concentration to a duopoly and |
| 6 | digital enabled advertising. |
| 7 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: You're |
| 8 | talking Facebook and Google? |
| 9 | MR. BEWKES: Yes, I am. And |
| 10 | I hope some of you I know that |
| 11 | the Google and Facebook people, |
| 12 | because we work with them and know |
| 13 | them well, there's one thing they |
| 14 | love and that's innovation and |
| 15 | competition. And we are here to |
| 16 | help. We are. We're going to |
| 17 | bring more of that, and that's |
| 18 | good not only for that's |
| 19 | basically a very good development |
| 20 | for all media companies, because |
| 21 | when you create the ability to |
| 22 Page 21 | have the same kind of digitally |

| 1 | powered advertising you get so |
|---------------|-------------------------------------|
| 2 | many benefits, you know, |
| 3 | competition always helps |
| 4 | consumers, and it gives |
| 5 | advertisers better choices. |
| 6 | But it, most important, |
| 7 | allows the consumer experience |
| 8 | watching video to have more |
| 9 | relevant ads, less intrusive and |
| 10 | interruptive ads. Therefore, |
| 11 | they're more valuable. Therefore, |
| 12 | more of the burden of cost of |
| 13 | content goes to advertising rather |
| 14 | than to people. |
| 15 | Again, more competition, |
| 16 | lower prices, better for consumers. |
| 17 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: Randall, |
| 18 | explain how these less intrusive |
| 19 | ads are going to work, because |
| 20 | they seem a bit intrusive, I have |
| 21 | to say. You're going to be able |
| 22 Page 22 | to target homes? You're going to |

| 1 | be able to pretty much know what |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | people are watching and then use |
| 3 | that data to |
| 4 | MR. BEWKES: I think we |
| 5 | should get the Google and Facebook |
| 6 | people come up. |
| 7 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: The last |
| 8 | question is in a bit. |
| 9 | MR. STEPHENSON: How that |
| 10 | works? So we have in the market |
| 11 | today an addressable advertising |
| 12 | platform. And we do have some |
| 13 | unique viewership data on our |
| 14 | platform. You know, we have the |
| 15 | largest video distribution |
| 16 | platform in US right now. So we |
| 17 | have some unique viewership data. |
| 18 | We anonymized that data. We |
| 19 | would never say, Rebecca, send |
| 20 | Rebecca an ad. But there are, you |
| 21 | know, 25, 50 Rebeccas out there |
| 22 Page 23 | who have a certain viewership |

| 1 | pattern. And that viewership |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | pattern informs what type of |
| 3 | advertising that individual would |
| 4 | find interesting and relevant to |
| 5 | them, and so literally begin to |
| 6 | direct and address advertising to |
| 7 | a segment of the market that has a |
| 8 | known viewing pattern or |
| 9 | discernible viewing pattern. |
| 10 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: And you |
| 11 | think this will allow you to |
| 12 | compete better with Facebook and |
| 13 | Google, specifically. |
| 14 | MR. STEPHENSON: I think it |
| 15 | will allow us to do a lot of |
| 16 | things, specifically provide |
| 17 | advertising that's more relevant |
| 18 | to the user. I think that's |
| 19 | really, really important, and I |
| 20 | think also it will allow us to |
| 21 | defray the content cost ensuing, |
| 22 Page 24 | because content costs, in spite of |

| 1 | what people write about this |
|---------------|-----------------------------------|
| 2 | industry, they're not going down. |
| 3 | The content costs continue to |
| 4 | escalate. |
| 5 | And if we really want to |
| 6 | keep that retail price point in |
| 7 | check and keep 20 million homes |
| 8 | that are not on the system from |
| 9 | growing dramatically over time we |
| 10 | have to find ways to keep those |
| 11 | prices down. |
| 12 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: Jeff, I |
| 13 | can't let you off the hook too |
| 14 | quickly about the regulators. |
| 15 | There seems to be a sense that |
| 16 | maybe they erred in not attaching |
| 17 | enough conditions to the Comcast |
| 18 | merger. And that's something that |
| 19 | there's a sense out there that |
| 20 | that's something that's going to |
| 21 | hurt this merger. |
| 22 Page 25 | What's your view of this? |

| 1 | MR. BEWKES: I'm not an |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | expert in that merger. I think, |
| 3 | if I understand this, and I may be |
| 4 | not exactly right, the reporting, |
| 5 | at that time, much of the |
| 6 | condition on what they thought |
| 7 | what NBC or the content-side |
| 8 | should should do in terms of |
| 9 | making content available, that may |
| 10 | be as much on what the distributor |
| 11 | should do, I'm not sure about |
| 12 | that. |
| 13 | Do you know? |
| 14 | MR. STEPHENSON: Yeah, they |
| 15 | actually well, the |
| 16 | distributors, they were going |
| 17 | after two things. They were |
| 18 | trying to remedy the vertical |
| 19 | integration. There were two |
| 20 | concerns they had, that neutrality |
| 21 | was a big one, there is. |
| 22 Page 26 | MR. BEWKES: Yeah. |

| 1 | MR. STEPHENSON: And so they |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | put conditions all over that thing |
| 3 | to ensure that they preserved the |
| 4 | principals of that neutrality. |
| 5 | And the second was they wanted to |
| 6 | protect the introduction of |
| 7 | over-the-top content players. |
| 8 | And so net neutrality, you |
| 9 | guys from Google, you won, right? |
| 10 | It's done. We don't have to worry |
| 11 | about that one, anymore. The |
| 12 | boogieman's gone, he's in a box, |
| 13 | you won't have to worry about that |
| 14 | neutrality anymore. |
| 15 | As it relates to OTT, Jeff |
| 16 | and I have talked and we've |
| 17 | concluded that Netflix is probably |
| 18 | going to be okay now. They might |
| 19 | make it. We don't think it's |
| 20 | necessary to protect the OTT guys |
| 21 | that much anymore. |
| 22 Page 27 | So the two issues that were |

| 1 | really relevant and critical six |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | years ago are largely they're kind |
| 3 | of matured and they've aged and |
| 4 | they're kind of not as relevant |
| 5 | now. |
| 6 | MR. BEWKES: If you don't |
| 7 | take it from us, Reed was here |
| 8 | last month and he said he was |
| 9 | fine. |
| 10 | MR. STEPHENSON: He said he |
| 11 | was fine as long as the broadband |
| 12 | connection was the same for him as |
| 13 | for everybody else, and that's net |
| 14 | neutrality, that's what net |
| 15 | neutrality is. |
| 16 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: In the |
| 17 | options market this morning placed |
| 18 | a 29 percent chance of this deal |
| 19 | going through. Are the markets |
| 20 | just pessimistic? |
| 21 | MR. BEWKES: Obviously we |
| 22 Page 28 | think so or else would we still be |

| 1 | sitting here? |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | MR. STEPHENSON: I think the |
| 3 | markets are too pessimistic. I |
| 4 | wish I could buy Time Warner stock |
| 5 | in advance, I would probably buy |
| 6 | some. I feel pretty good about |
| 7 | about this deal. Once it gets |
| 8 | into the hands of the regulators |
| 9 | the filings are done, the |
| 10 | professionals, who actually do |
| 11 | these things for a living, get |
| 12 | into it, I think the data and the |
| 13 | law will dictate how this deal was |
| 14 | handled. |
| 15 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: You made a |
| 16 | call that didn't go so well with |
| 17 | T-Mobile. Does this I mean, |
| 18 | would you say that |
| 19 | MR. STEPHENSON: You're just |
| 20 | bringing all kinds of pleasant |
| 21 | issues up, aren't you? |
| 22 Page 29 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: It's my |

| 1 | job. |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | MR. STEPHENSON: Let's go |
| 3 | back to AOL. Let's go back to |
| 4 | AOL, okay? |
| 5 | (Laughter) |
| 6 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: Would you |
| 7 | say the regulatory risk of this |
| 8 | deal, you talked about it, I guess |
| 9 | it came together quickly, but for |
| 10 | a couple of months was that the |
| 11 | biggest call you had to make, is |
| 12 | your lawyer the person who this |
| 13 | came down to, is this something |
| 14 | that you would say is a close |
| 15 | call? |
| 16 | MR. STEPHENSON: Look, this |
| 17 | is not T-Mobile close. T-Mobile |
| 18 | was a classic horizontal merger. |
| 19 | We actually thought, based on the |
| 20 | way the DOJ had defined the market |
| 21 | in multiple transaction, before, |
| 22 Page 30 | that even that horizontal merger |

| 2 knew, going in, that one was a 3 high-risk deal, that's why they 4 had such a breakup deal because 5 the company was requiring high 6 risk. 7 So we knew going in that 8 that one had a lot of risk around 9 it, because it was a classic 10 horizontal merger. You were 11 taking a competitor, a nationwide 12 competitor, out of the 13 marketplace. 14 Recognize, this one, you 15 can't even compare the two. This 16 is, once again, a vertical merger. 17 No no competitive environment 18 is changing, in the least, here. 19 The media competitive environment 20 is not changing, the Telecom 21 market is not changing. 22 MS. BLUMENSTEIN: I want to | 1 | would be good, but that was we |
|--|---------------|------------------------------------|
| had such a breakup deal because the company was requiring high risk. So we knew going in that that one had a lot of risk around it, because it was a classic horizontal merger. You were taking a competitor, a nationwide competitor, out of the marketplace. Recognize, this one, you can't even compare the two. This is, once again, a vertical merger. No no competitive environment is changing, in the least, here. The media competitive environment is not changing, the Telecom market is not changing. MS. BLUMENSTEIN: I want to | 2 | knew, going in, that one was a |
| the company was requiring high risk. So we knew going in that that one had a lot of risk around it, because it was a classic horizontal merger. You were taking a competitor, a nationwide competitor, out of the marketplace. Recognize, this one, you can't even compare the two. This is, once again, a vertical merger. No no competitive environment is changing, in the least, here. The media competitive environment is not changing, the Telecom market is not changing. MS. BLUMENSTEIN: I want to | 3 | high-risk deal, that's why they |
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| that one had a lot of risk around it, because it was a classic horizontal merger. You were taking a competitor, a nationwide competitor, out of the marketplace. Recognize, this one, you can't even compare the two. This is, once again, a vertical merger. No no competitive environment is changing, in the least, here. The media competitive environment is not changing, the Telecom market is not changing. MS. BLUMENSTEIN: I want to | 5 | the company was requiring high |
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| 9 it, because it was a classic 10 horizontal merger. You were 11 taking a competitor, a nationwide 12 competitor, out of the 13 marketplace. 14 Recognize, this one, you 15 can't even compare the two. This 16 is, once again, a vertical merger. 17 No no competitive environment 18 is changing, in the least, here. 19 The media competitive environment 20 is not changing, the Telecom 21 market is not changing. 22 MS. BLUMENSTEIN: I want to | 7 | So we knew going in that |
| 10 horizontal merger. You were 11 taking a competitor, a nationwide 12 competitor, out of the 13 marketplace. 14 Recognize, this one, you 15 can't even compare the two. This 16 is, once again, a vertical merger. 17 No no competitive environment 18 is changing, in the least, here. 19 The media competitive environment 20 is not changing, the Telecom 21 market is not changing. 22 MS. BLUMENSTEIN: I want to | 8 | that one had a lot of risk around |
| taking a competitor, a nationwide competitor, out of the marketplace. Recognize, this one, you can't even compare the two. This is, once again, a vertical merger. No no competitive environment is changing, in the least, here. The media competitive environment is not changing, the Telecom market is not changing. MS. BLUMENSTEIN: I want to | 9 | it, because it was a classic |
| 12 competitor, out of the 13 marketplace. 14 Recognize, this one, you 15 can't even compare the two. This 16 is, once again, a vertical merger. 17 No no competitive environment 18 is changing, in the least, here. 19 The media competitive environment 20 is not changing, the Telecom 21 market is not changing. 22 MS. BLUMENSTEIN: I want to | 10 | horizontal merger. You were |
| marketplace. Recognize, this one, you can't even compare the two. This is, once again, a vertical merger. No no competitive environment is changing, in the least, here. The media competitive environment is not changing, the Telecom market is not changing. MS. BLUMENSTEIN: I want to | 11 | taking a competitor, a nationwide |
| Recognize, this one, you 15 can't even compare the two. This 16 is, once again, a vertical merger. 17 No no competitive environment 18 is changing, in the least, here. 19 The media competitive environment 20 is not changing, the Telecom 21 market is not changing. 22 MS. BLUMENSTEIN: I want to | 12 | competitor, out of the |
| 15 can't even compare the two. This 16 is, once again, a vertical merger. 17 No no competitive environment 18 is changing, in the least, here. 19 The media competitive environment 20 is not changing, the Telecom 21 market is not changing. 22 MS. BLUMENSTEIN: I want to | 13 | marketplace. |
| is, once again, a vertical merger. No no competitive environment is changing, in the least, here. The media competitive environment is not changing, the Telecom market is not changing. MS. BLUMENSTEIN: I want to | 14 | Recognize, this one, you |
| No no competitive environment is changing, in the least, here. The media competitive environment is not changing, the Telecom market is not changing. MS. BLUMENSTEIN: I want to | 15 | can't even compare the two. This |
| 18 is changing, in the least, here. 19 The media competitive environment 20 is not changing, the Telecom 21 market is not changing. 22 MS. BLUMENSTEIN: I want to | 16 | is, once again, a vertical merger. |
| The media competitive environment is not changing, the Telecom market is not changing. MS. BLUMENSTEIN: I want to | 17 | No no competitive environment |
| 20 is not changing, the Telecom 21 market is not changing. 22 MS. BLUMENSTEIN: I want to | 18 | is changing, in the least, here. |
| 21 market is not changing. 22 MS. BLUMENSTEIN: I want to | 19 | The media competitive environment |
| MS. BLUMENSTEIN: I want to | 20 | is not changing, the Telecom |
| | 21 | market is not changing. |
| | 22 Page 31 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: I want to |

| Page 32 | |
|---------|------------------------------------|
| 22 | of resource and capabilities |
| 21 | of that, doesn't provide the kind |
| 20 | involved in it, it also, because |
| 19 | issues, including regulatory ones |
| 18 | merger, it has not only different |
| 17 | horizontal, that's a horizontal |
| 16 | Time Warner or any kind of media |
| 15 | first of all. Secondly, the Fox, |
| 14 | were you know, time got us on, |
| 13 | MR. BEWKES: Well, what we |
| 12 | when Randall asked? |
| 11 | What what was different |
| 10 | couple years ago and you said no. |
| 9 | tried to tried to buy you a |
| 8 | mean, obviously 20th Century Fox |
| 7 | I guess the question is to you, I |
| 6 | cultures and companies and, Jeff, |
| 5 | You both come from very different |
| 4 | Jeff. You were a bit surprised. |
| 3 | had lunch and you brought it up to |
| 2 | together. Apparently, you both |
| 1 | talk a bit about how the deal came |

| 1 | changes either to rox or to us |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | that something like this would. |
| 3 | So I think the difference, |
| 4 | now, is and you could do this |
| 5 | in light of our Time Warner Cable |
| 6 | spin, as well, seven/eight years |
| 7 | ago, what you have now, we all |
| 8 | know this, and it's, you know, I'm |
| 9 | for me, saying it to all of |
| 10 | you, you're out here living in the |
| 11 | digital world, very cleanly, you |
| 12 | got the distribution platforms or |
| 13 | the distribution pipes becoming |
| 14 | not dumb, smarter all the time. |
| 15 | And so everything needs to |
| 16 | be seamless across the in-home |
| 17 | television, the mobile device |
| 18 | going out the house, you got to |
| 19 | have that, we all know you have to |
| 20 | have much better curation, |
| 21 | navigation, recommendation, easy |
| 22 Page 33 | ability to find things, because |

| 1 | with that you need full view ID of |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | broadband enables you to have, and |
| 3 | all of that in the evolution of |
| 4 | the distribution platform means |
| 5 | that there's much more ability to |
| 6 | customize off for us, either what |
| 7 | you offer to subscribe to, what |
| 8 | product, individually, you might |
| 9 | want to look at, because there's |
| 10 | more and more of it all the time, |
| 11 | how the advertising works to |
| 12 | support it, which is no longer |
| 13 | point to mass, you know, you buy a |
| 14 | 30 and a you know, for five |
| 15 | million people watching something |
| 16 | when some advertisers can do it |
| 17 | for the advertiser for particular |
| 18 | people that are interested in that |
| 19 | product. |
| 20 | So with all of those changes |
| 21 | what we all needed in the media |
| 22 Page 34 | business, and I think it's true of |

| 1 | all media network companies, is we |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | need the distribution industry to |
| 3 | be more capable in bringing those |
| 4 | benefits to network TV and even |
| 5 | movie releases and all of that, |
| 6 | and that's what AT&T offers, that |
| 7 | huge scale of direct selling |
| 8 | platform, direct customer |
| 9 | relationships, consumer data about |
| 10 | what people want, for both content |
| 11 | origination and delivery, and also |
| 12 | for advertising support, all |
| 13 | better for consumers, you all know |
| 14 | that, that's what occurs at |
| 15 | Google, Facebook, YouTube, |
| 16 | Netflix, et cetera. |
| 17 | So that's what the advantage |
| 18 | of this is, that time has come. |
| 19 | Now, that doesn't mean that every |
| 20 | media network company needs to be |
| 21 | co-owned and operated with |
| 22 Page 35 | distribution plants, because if |

| 1 | you have this kind of change in |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | the distribution ecosystem what we |
| 3 | think is going to happen, and |
| 4 | Randall said at the beginning, we |
| 5 | don't want network packages that |
| 6 | are reduced to our networks and |
| 7 | not there's people that are |
| 8 | interested in T&T are interested |
| 9 | in FX. They tend to like those |
| 10 | shows. If they like HBO they like |
| 11 | Netflix and Showtime. |
| 12 | So we want the right |
| 13 | packages for consumers. And we |
| 14 | think what this will do is cause |
| 15 | adoption of other network |
| 16 | companies to do what we've tried |
| 17 | to do, we didn't get followed in |
| 18 | terms of consumer benefits as much |
| 19 | as we'd hoped, and it will have |
| 20 | the other distribution platforms |
| 21 | make the same innovations because |
| 22 Page 36 | if they don't the consumers are |

| 1 | the ones who are in charge of all |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | this, and they're going to get |
| 3 | what they want. |
| 4 | And if the media business, |
| 5 | with its distribution, doesn't |
| 6 | give it then they are going to get |
| 7 | it through the next industry. |
| 8 | And, you know, that's the, quote, |
| 9 | tech industry also very helpful in |
| 10 | terms of the innovations that |
| 11 | they've brought to this, but we |
| 12 | all know they're all coming |
| 13 | together. I mean, that's why |
| 14 | we're doing it. |
| 15 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: Randall, |
| 16 | before we go to questions I just |
| 17 | have to ask you about culture and |
| 18 | some execution. You have come up |
| 19 | from your very working days to a |
| 20 | phone company. You have |
| 21 | installers, and you have calling |
| 22 Page 37 | centers, and Time Warner is a very |

| 1 | different culture. |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | MR. BEWKES: We have a call |
| 3 | center. We have a call center. |
| 4 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: How are |
| 5 | you how are you I mean, Time |
| 6 | Warner's creative, are you going |
| 7 | to be committed to keeping it a |
| 8 | separate unit? You're you're |
| 9 | not going to interfere with calls |
| 10 | and Game of Thrones and CNN? |
| 11 | You're going to |
| 12 | MR. STEPHENSON: He does |
| 13 | want to do the casting on Game of |
| 14 | Thrones. He told me that. |
| 15 | JEFF; I know Richard's |
| 16 | here, this is going to be a little |
| 17 | awkward. We have a guy that runs |
| 18 | the network that I think would be |
| 19 | great at running HBO. And so I |
| 20 | think |
| 21 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: You mean |
| 22 Page 38 | the phone network, then? |

| 1 | MR. STEPHENSON: No, look, I |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | understand, I'll be the first to |
| 3 | tell you, I've never run a movie |
| 4 | studio. I don't know the first |
| 5 | thing about it, and I've never run |
| 6 | a premium content delivery |
| 7 | company, like HBO. I don't know |
| 8 | the first thing about it. |
| 9 | And so we will be conscious |
| 10 | and thoughtful about how we |
| 11 | organize this, and the way it will |
| 12 | be organized is Time Warner will |
| 13 | be a wholly-owned, separate |
| 14 | subsidiary of AT&T, that's just |
| 15 | that's how we'll structure it, and |
| 16 | we'll have the experts that know |
| 17 | how to run these businesses |
| 18 | running these businesses. |
| 19 | We'll have to figure out the |
| 20 | management art and even the |
| 21 | management science on how to |
| 22 Page 39 | affect these issues that we're |

| 1 | taiking about, now do we anow our |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | viewership data to begin to |
| 3 | influence content creation, |
| 4 | Richard? And how do we begin to |
| 5 | use that data on content that has |
| 6 | been created? How do we direct it |
| 7 | and promote it to the right |
| 8 | audiences and so forth? How do we |
| 9 | use that data to begin to inform |
| 10 | and actually affect the |
| 11 | advertising avails that are within |
| 12 | the Turner Network? |
| 13 | I mean, there's so many |
| 14 | advertising avails in there that |
| 15 | as we get really good and targeted |
| 16 | at addressable advertising we |
| 17 | think we can change the yield on |
| 18 | advertising within Turner |
| 19 | Networks. |
| 20 | And so there's going to be a |
| 21 | management challenge on how do you |
| 22 Page 40 | affect that, right? And how do |

| 1 | you put mechanisms in place to |
|---------------|-----------------------------------|
| 2 | cause that to happen. |
| 3 | I feel really confident |
| 4 | that's a logistical we've done |
| 5 | harder logistical issues than |
| 6 | that, before, with difficult |
| 7 | organizational challenges. |
| 8 | So I look, I know there |
| 9 | are different cultures and we'll |
| 10 | be protective of the cultures to |
| 11 | ensure we don't destroy the |
| 12 | business. But I am not that |
| 13 | concerned that we can't manage |
| 14 | through it. |
| 15 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: And I |
| 16 | think you're heading over to the |
| 17 | movie studio, after this, I |
| 18 | understand? |
| 19 | MR. STEPHENSON: That's |
| 20 | right. I'm going to unbutton my |
| 21 | shirt, like Richards, over there. |
| 22 Page 41 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: I would |

| Page 42 | • |
|---------|-----------------------------------|
| 22 | we are in an all-out push of |
| 21 | three, five years downstream, but |
| 20 | enthusiastic about it, this is |
| 19 | deal, the reasons I can get so |
| 18 | fundamental underpinnings of this |
| 17 | But look, one of the |
| 16 | take that, Jeff. You can add on. |
| 15 | MR. STEPHENSON: So I'll |
| 14 | homes more places? |
| 13 | infrastructure or to get to more |
| 12 | going to do to amplify their |
| 11 | What is Time Warner and AT&T |
| 10 | mobile, excellent. |
| 9 | very smart, premium content for |
| 8 | strategy is sound, very simple, |
| 7 | of Sky Catch. I think the |
| 6 | Christian Sands, I'm the strategy |
| 5 | MR. SANDS: Hi, my name is |
| 4 | Please identify yourself. |
| 3 | here in the front. There's a mic. |
| 2 | if there are any. I see one right |
| 1 | like to open it up to questions, |

| 1 | getting the standard set around |
|---------------|-----------------------------------|
| 2 | 5G, around getting the vendor |
| 3 | community going on 5G. |
| 4 | Where our software defined |
| 5 | networking technology is ramping |
| 6 | and is scaling, which is critical |
| 7 | for scaling content delivery at |
| 8 | the level we're talking about |
| 9 | doing here, when 5G is up and |
| 10 | deployed it becomes a nationwide |
| 11 | platform of video delivery, |
| 12 | period. Hear me on this. This is |
| 13 | a one gig network capability |
| 14 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: When is |
| 15 | that? |
| 16 | MR. STEPHENSON: that is |
| 17 | wireless and mobile. |
| 18 | What is that? |
| 19 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: When is 5G |
| 20 | up? |
| 21 | MR. STEPHENSON: We'll be |
| 22 Page 43 | deploying in 2018. And they'll |

| 1 | scale, probably, in the 2019, 2020 |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | time horizon. But this is |
| 3 | exciting, all right? And it's |
| 4 | exciting for content, it's |
| 5 | exciting for video delivery, but |
| 6 | it's exciting for autonomous |
| 7 | cards. |
| 8 | The guys at Zooks need 5G to |
| 9 | get autonomous cars on the roads |
| 10 | in San Francisco by 2020. It's |
| 11 | really important. Virtual |
| 12 | reality, you guys working on |
| 13 | virtual reality and augmented |
| 14 | reality, you need this for that, |
| 15 | you guys working on health care |
| 16 | applications, and so forth, you |
| 17 | need 5G, low latency, really fast |
| 18 | networks with high capacity, |
| 19 | that's I got to tell you, |
| 20 | that's one of the reasons I get |
| 21 | most enthusiastic about what we're |
| 22 Page 44 | trying to put together here. |

| 1 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: Any other |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | questions? Right in the back, |
| 3 | there. |
| 4 | >> (Inaudible) Now, would |
| 5 | there be an alternative to see how |
| 6 | direct TV, you wouldn't |
| 7 | necessarily need a satellite dish, |
| 8 | you would actually get the |
| 9 | content. And now you, Sterling, |
| 10 | spoke about offering \$35 over 100 |
| 11 | channels, it's really exciting to |
| 12 | see the portfolio of apps that you |
| 13 | have, now, bringing in HBO Go, HBO |
| 14 | Now, how do you actually look at |
| 15 | the portfolio of apps, because you |
| 16 | have so many ways to distribute |
| 17 | the content, and how will that |
| 18 | affect, certainly, pricing |
| 19 | packages as well as the |
| 20 | distribution across cities and the |
| 21 | way consumers connect as to |
| 22 Page 45 | content? |

| 1 | MR. STEPHENSON: Okay, it's |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | a good question, because look, |
| 3 | I for a long time there are |
| 4 | going to be households, like many |
| 5 | of you in this room, where you |
| 6 | need three 80-inch screens in your |
| 7 | house, streaming 4K, you know, |
| 8 | into your home. You're a heavy |
| 9 | video centric, sport centric |
| 10 | content consumer, and multiple |
| 11 | streams, satellite delivery is |
| 12 | going to be the vehicle for that, |
| 13 | for a long, long time, all right? |
| 14 | I just for that kind of |
| 15 | distribution it's going to be hard |
| 16 | the amounts of bandwidth, okay? |
| 17 | You start working down, |
| 18 | there's going to be different |
| 19 | segments of the market you deliver |
| 20 | that content differently, okay? I |
| 21 | do believe, you know, in the |
| 22 Page 46 | future, that one of the |

| Page 47 | |
|---------|------------------------------------|
| 22 | That's a radical concept, |
| 21 | provide. |
| 20 | all of the content that these guys |
| 19 | you're streaming Direct TV Now and |
| 18 | download an app, you subscribe and |
| 17 | You go to the web, you |
| 16 | 6, 7 hundred dollar set top box. |
| 15 | to install it, you don't have a 5, |
| 14 | going out and spending four hours |
| 13 | roof, you don't have a technician |
| 12 | have a satellite dish on a hooked |
| 11 | The way you get there is you don't |
| 10 | guys charge for content, right? |
| 9 | price point with the prices these |
| 8 | How do you get to a \$35 |
| 7 | extreme, Direct TV Now, \$35. |
| 6 | exciting, because take it to its |
| 5 | go down, that starts to get really |
| 4 | web continues to get integrations |
| 3 | boxes, be web, all right? As the |
| 2 | content will be with out set top |
| 1 | pre-premium means for derivering |

| 1 | right? That's how costs come down |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | dramatically and that's how you |
| 3 | hit a \$35 price point in the |
| 4 | marketplace. |
| 5 | So it's going to be a wide |
| 6 | range of offerings, some wireless |
| 7 | only, some satellite, some in |
| 8 | between. |
| 9 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: Jeff, how |
| 10 | do you feel about getting back |
| 11 | into the cable business? |
| 12 | MR. BEWKES: It's great. |
| 13 | We've been working with and trying |
| 14 | to evolve the cable and all the |
| 15 | other distribution businesses for |
| 16 | 30 years. So we are always on |
| 17 | that game. We're always trying to |
| 18 | do that. |
| 19 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: So you're |
| 20 | serious about forming a competitor |
| 21 | to cable, a nationwide competitor |
| 22 Page 48 | to cable? |

| 1 | MR. STEPHENSON: I can't |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | tell you I border on |
| 3 | evangelical about it, all right? |
| 4 | MR. BEWKES: You can hear |
| 5 | that. |
| 6 | MR. STEPHENSON: This is the |
| 7 | most exciting thing I've been a |
| 8 | part of in a long time and I can't |
| 9 | wait. |
| 10 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: More |
| 11 | questions? This is my friend, |
| 12 | Oren. Here comes the mic. |
| 13 | OREN: Thank you, Oren |
| 14 | Michaels, from Cloudery. |
| 15 | Twenty years ago next year |
| 16 | David Eisenberg wrote The Rise of |
| 17 | the Stupid Network. He was an |
| 18 | employee of AT&T and was fired for |
| 19 | writing it, very impressions, and |
| 20 | Warren begins content company, |
| 21 | essentially, at the time, twisting |
| 22 Page 49 | themselves into pretzels to |

| 1 | optimize for the parent company's |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | network quality independence, were |
| 3 | more nimble and able to take |
| 4 | whatever network they wanted. |
| 5 | Most of the people in this |
| 6 | room are now moving to the cloud, |
| 7 | where we're getting out of the |
| 8 | business of owning our own atoms |
| 9 | and dealing with our bits. |
| 10 | Why are you guys, through |
| 11 | going in the exact opposite |
| 12 | direction when everybody seems to |
| 13 | want to not own the hardware if |
| 14 | they're if they're creating the |
| 15 | the value on top? |
| 16 | MR. STEPHENSON: You go |
| 17 | ahead. |
| 18 | MR. BEWKES: So your premise |
| 19 | or his seems to be that at that |
| 20 | time the content companies he was |
| 21 | looking at were changing either |
| 22 Page 50 | what they did or where they put it |

| 1 | in order to serve whoever their |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | vertical, that was it. |
| 3 | OREN: The network area has |
| 4 | limitations federally in |
| 5 | distribution. |
| 6 | MR. BEWKES: Yeah, well, I |
| 7 | think the difference with that, |
| 8 | because that would be bad for the |
| 9 | content, whether it was the Fox |
| 10 | content or ours, what what |
| 11 | you know, one owned or one not. |
| 12 | The problem now, and if you |
| 13 | go and look at and I'm sure |
| 14 | many of you in internet-based |
| 15 | companies tried to do this, when |
| 16 | you innovate with media rights you |
| 17 | encounter the fact that media |
| 18 | rights are pretty complicated in |
| 19 | video because there are Windows |
| 20 | and there's all these things that |
| 21 | you've all seen, that's why it's |
| 22 Page 51 | been hard to innovate in media |

| 1 | because it's kind of difficult to |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | get an innovation in and then have |
| 3 | it get applied essentially |
| 4 | universally, across an entire |
| 5 | suite of networks, or to break up |
| 6 | network groupings and so forth. |
| 7 | I don't think that is what |
| 8 | we're looking at, here. We're |
| 9 | certainly not, in our case, and |
| 10 | you've said it and I've said it, |
| 11 | we both know this, we would never, |
| 12 | in our media business at Time |
| 13 | Warner, and we have never did, |
| 14 | including in the AOL days, |
| 15 | restrict or change what we're |
| 16 | doing in either the innovation of |
| 17 | our distribution for our content, |
| 18 | how our content works, the form of |
| 19 | the content, we always wanted to |
| 20 | be maximally delivered by every |
| 21 | kind of distribution. |
| 22 Page 52 | What this is about is |

| 1 | catalyzing that, not restricting |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | it, it would be idiotic to |
| 3 | restrict it. |
| 4 | MR. STEPHENSON: And to |
| 5 | perhaps challenge the fundamental |
| 6 | premise of your statement, that as |
| 7 | you begin to push more and more |
| 8 | content to the cloud that it |
| 9 | requires less and less in terms of |
| 10 | smartness, if you will, out of the |
| 11 | network, it's the opposite, in |
| 12 | fact, we're experiencing just the |
| 13 | opposite. |
| 14 | The more you guys push more |
| 15 | and more into the cloud the more |
| 16 | it's requiring greater and greater |
| 17 | intelligence out of the network. |
| 18 | And one could argue, wow, |
| 19 | shouldn't you be commoditizing the |
| 20 | network the more you get into the |
| 21 | cloud? No. The more companies |
| 22 Page 53 | that are putting mission critical |

| 1 | capabilities into the cloud the |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | more it scares the hell out of |
| 3 | them on security, the more it |
| 4 | worries them about quality of |
| 5 | service, all right? |
| 6 | You just run some of these |
| 7 | mission critical applications over |
| 8 | the open internet you're not going |
| 9 | to like it. |
| 10 | We have a product, and |
| 11 | you'll see it as it relates to |
| 12 | what we're going to be doing here |
| 13 | together, called Net Bond. It was |
| 14 | created and invented and patented |
| 15 | just for this purpose, because |
| 16 | people want to put stuff in the |
| 17 | Amazon cloud, mission critical |
| 18 | information, applications, compute |
| 19 | and so forth, they say, but I'm |
| 20 | scared to death of it, I need |
| 21 | security. |
| 22 Page 54 | And so we have created Net |

| 1 | Bond and we have bonded every |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | major cloud provider, Amazon, |
| 3 | Microsoft, Azure, salesforce.com, |
| 4 | I can go on and on and on, to |
| 5 | ensure that our customers, when |
| 6 | they take a smart phone out of |
| 7 | their pocket and go to access an |
| 8 | application or data in the cloud |
| 9 | it never touches the public |
| 10 | internet, that is their number one |
| 11 | requirement. |
| 12 | That's what this product is, |
| 13 | it is exploding. Connections of |
| 14 | Net Bond are up 4X this year. The |
| 15 | traffic over Net Bond, connections |
| 16 | are up 4X, the traffic is up 8X, |
| 17 | that tells you how much people are |
| 18 | concentrating mission critical |
| 19 | applications. |
| 20 | We go to 5G and we that |
| 21 | our Direct TV Now is a |
| 22 Page 55 | cloud-based platform for |

| 1 | delivering content, all right? |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| 2 | You can't just do that over the |
| 3 | open internet. There have to be |
| 4 | elements of it that you control |
| 5 | end-to-end, the CEN has to be on |
| 6 | your control. |
| 7 | There's a sophistication in |
| 8 | delivering this, and a true what I |
| 9 | would call cable-like experience. |
| 10 | And so I would suggest to you the |
| 11 | more you push elements into the |
| 12 | cloud the more sophisticated and |
| 13 | smart the networking elements have |
| 14 | to become. |
| 15 | MS. BLUMENSTEIN: Well, |
| 16 | unfortunately we're out of time. |
| 17 | Thank you both so much for coming, |
| 18 | it's a fascinating topic. |
| 19 | MR. STEPHENSON: Thank you |
| 20 | very much. |
| 21 | MR. BEWKES: Thank you. |
| 22 Page 56 | Appreciate it. |

1 (Concluded at 2:27 p.m.)

Cautionary Language Concerning Forward-Looking Statements

Information set forth in this communication, including financial estimates and statements as to the expected timing, completion and effects of the proposed merger between AT&T and Time Warner, constitute forward-looking statements within the meaning of the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and the rules, regulations and releases of the Securities and Exchange Commission. These forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties, and actual results might differ materially from those discussed in, or implied by, the forward-looking statements. Such forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, statements about the benefits of the merger, including future financial and operating results, the combined company's plans, objectives, expectations and intentions, and other statements that are not historical facts. Such statements are based upon the current beliefs and expectations of the management of AT&T and Time Warner and are subject to significant risks and uncertainties outside of our control.

Among the risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ from those described in the forward-looking statements are the following: (1) the occurrence of any event, change or other circumstances that could give rise to the termination of the merger agreement, (2) the risk that Time Warner stockholders may not adopt the merger agreement, (3) the risk that the necessary regulatory approvals may not be obtained or may be obtained subject to conditions that are not anticipated, (4) risks that any of the closing conditions to the proposed merger may not be satisfied in a timely manner, (5) risks related to disruption of management time from ongoing business operations due to the proposed merger, (6) failure to realize the benefits expected from the proposed merger and (7) the effect of the announcement of the proposed merger on the ability of Time Warner and AT&T to retain customers and retain and hire key personnel and maintain relationships with their suppliers, and on their operating results and businesses generally. Discussions of additional risks and uncertainties are and will be contained in AT&T's and Time Warner's filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Neither AT&T nor Time Warner is under any obligation, and each expressly disclaim any obligation, to update, alter, or otherwise revise any forward-looking statements, whether written or oral, that may be made from time to time, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise. Persons reading this communication are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements which speak only as of the date hereof.

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This communication does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy any securities or a solicitation of any vote or approval, nor shall there be any sale of securities in any jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration or qualification under the securities laws of any such jurisdiction. No offer of securities shall be made except by means of a prospectus meeting the requirements of Section 10 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.

Additional Information and Where to Find It

In connection with the proposed merger, AT&T intends to file a registration statement on Form S-4, containing a proxy statement/prospectus with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). AT&T and Time Warner will make the proxy statement/prospectus available to their respective stockholders and AT&T and Time Warner will file other documents regarding the proposed merger with the SEC. This communication is not intended to be, and is not, a substitute for such filings or for any other document that AT&T or Time Warner may file with the SEC in connection with the proposed merger. STOCKHOLDERS OF TIME WARNER ARE URGED TO READ ALL RELEVANT DOCUMENTS FILED WITH THE SEC, INCLUDING THE REGISTRATION STATEMENT AND THE PROXY STATEMENT/PROSPECTUS CAREFULLY WHEN THEY BECOME AVAILABLE, BECAUSE THEY WILL CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT AT&T, TIME WARNER AND THE PROPOSED MERGER. Investors and security holders will be able to obtain copies of the proxy statement/prospectus as well as other filings containing information about AT&T and Time Warner once they become available, without charge, at the SEC's website, http://www.sec.gov. Copies of documents filed with the SEC by AT&T will be made available free of charge on AT&T's investor relations website at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=113088&p=irol-sec. Copies of documents filed with the SEC by Time Warner will be made available free of charge on Time Warner's

investor relations website at http://ir.timewarner.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=70972&p=irol-sec.

Participants in Solicitation

AT&T, Time Warner and certain of their respective directors and executive officers and other members of management and employees may be deemed to be participants in the solicitation of proxies from the holders of Time Warner common stock in respect to the proposed merger. Information about the directors and executive officers of AT&T is set forth in the proxy statement for AT&T's 2016 Annual Meeting of Stockholders, which was filed with the SEC on March 11, 2016. Information about the directors and executive officers of Time Warner is set forth in the proxy statement for Time Warner's 2016 Annual Meeting of Stockholders, which was filed with the SEC on May 19, 2016. Investors may obtain additional information regarding the interest of such participants by reading the proxy statement/prospectus regarding the proposed merger when it becomes available and other relevant materials filed with the SEC. These documents will be available free of charge from the sources indicated above. Page 57